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This paper is the first attempt to structurally estimate the impact of globalization on markups and welfare
in a monopolistic competition model. To achieve this, we work with a class of preferences that allow
for endogenous markups and firm entry and exit that are especially convenient for empirical work
– the translog preferences, with symmetry in substitution imposed across products. Between 1992
and 2005 we find the U.S. market experienced a series of changes that confirm the predictions of Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008): import shares rose and U.S. firms exited, leading to a fall in markups, while
product variety and welfare went up. We estimate the impacts of these effects on a national level, and
find a cumulative drop of 5.4 percent in merchandise prices and of 1.0 percent in overall consumer
prices between 1992 and 2005. Although the magnitude of the welfare gains in our translog setup is
similar to that obtained by assuming CES preferences, the sources of these gains are quite different.
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1.  Introduction 
  A promise of the monopolistic competition model in trade was that it offered additional 
sources of the gains from trade, beyond that from comparative advantage (e.g. Krugman (1979) 
and more recently Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)). These additional sources include: consumer 
gains due to the expansion of import varieties; efficiency gains due to increasing returns to scale; 
and welfare gains due to reduced markups. While the first two sources of gains have received 
recent empirical attention,
1 the promise of the third source – reduced markups – has not yet been 
realized. To be sure, there are estimates of reduced markups due to trade for several countries: 
Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey; Harrison (1994) for the Ivory Coast; and Badinger (2007a) for 
European countries. But these cases rely on dramatic liberalizations to identify the change in 
markups and are not tied in theory to the monopolistic competition model. The reason that this 
model is not used to estimate the change in markups is because of the prominence of the constant 
elasticity of demand (CES) system, with its implied constant markups. To avoid that case, the 
above authors do not specify the functional form for demand and instead rely on a natural 
experiment to identify the change in markups.  
For these reasons, we do not have evidence beyond these case studies about how the 
broad process of globalization affects markups, and particularly no evidence on the impact of 
such markup reductions on U.S. welfare. This paper is the first attempt to structurally estimate 
the impact of globalization on markups and welfare in a monopolistic competition model. To 
achieve that, we work with a class of preferences that are new to that literature – the translog 
preferences, with symmetry in substitution imposed across products. These preferences are 
                                                 
1  The consumer gains due import variety have been estimated for the U.S. by Broda and Weinstein (2006). Gains 
due to increasing returns to scale, or more specifically due to the self-selection of efficient firms (as in Melitz, 2003) 
have been demonstrated for Canada by Trefler (2004) and for a broader sample of countries by Badinger (2007b, 
2008).
  See also Head and Ries (1999, 2001) for Canada, and Tybout et al (1991, 1995) for Chile and Mexico.    2
known to have good properties for empirical work (Diewert, 1976): they are homothetic; can 
give a second-order approximation to an arbitrary expenditure function; and correspond to the 
Törnqvist price index, which is very close to price index formulas that are used in practice. 
Furthermore, these preferences prove to be highly tractable even as the range of import varieties 
change, so they can join the quadratic preferences used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) as being 
alternatives to the CES case that allow for endogenous markups.
2  
In the translog case the elasticity of demand is inversely related to a product’s market 
share, so markups fall as more firms enter, which we call the pro-competitive effect. On the other 
hand, domestic firms may exit as foreign competition intensifies, offsetting some of this gain to 
consumers. This we will refer to as the domestic exit effect. Incorporating these two effects into 
the analysis allows us to estimate the impact of globalization on markups. Furthermore, this class 
of preferences also allows us to address a potential criticism of Broda and Weinstein (2006): that 
by assuming CES preferences, it may overstate the gains from import variety.
3 The translog 
system allows for an alternative estimate of the variety gains, which we find are at least one-third 
smaller than in the CES case. But our combined gains for the U.S. due to import variety and the 
pro-competitive effect are of the same magnitude as Broda and Weinstein’s CES estimates. 
Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in 
that the globalization of the U.S. economy between 1992 and 2005, as measured by the rise in 
import penetration, was associated with a substantial decline in the number of producers in the 
                                                 
2  The quadratic preferences used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) lead to linear demand curves with zero income 
elasticity, though country population can act as a demand shift parameter. Demand curves of this type and the 
associated markups are estimated in the industrial organization literature: see Bresnahan (1989) and the recent trade 
application by Blonigen et al (2007). For other preferences that are non-homothetic and allow for variable markups 
see Behrens et al (2008) and Simonovska (2008).  
3  The gains from a new product variety can be thought of as the area under the demand curve and above the price 
when the product first appears. While the CES system has an infinite reservation  price, this area under the demand 
curve is still bounded above (provided the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity). But it can be expected that 
the gains from new product varieties in this case might exceed the gain from other functional forms with finite 
reservation prices, as is the case for the translog system.   3
U.S. As a result, U.S. Herfindahl indexes rose in many markets. The product of the Herfindahl 
index and the overall U.S. market share measures the market share of the typical U.S. firm. 
While the Herfindahls rose due to exit, the overall U.S. market share fell by more, so it follows 
that the typical per-firm share of a surviving U.S. producer also fell. That finding provides us 
with prima facie evidence that there has been an increase in competition and reduced markups. 
In fact, for the translog system, the sum of the Herfindahl indexes for U.S. producers and for 
exporters to the U.S., weighted by their squared market shares, is precisely the right way to 
measure competition, and we show that these “market-level” Herfindahl indexes have fallen in 
many sectors.  
Our results suggest that globalization has been exerting important economic impacts on 
the U.S. economy. Our point estimate for the cumulative gains to U.S. consumers from new 
varieties and decreased markups is 1.0 percent over the period 1992 to 2005. However, the 
impact on the merchandise sector (agriculture, manufacturing, and mining) was much larger.  
The welfare gains in that sector was equivalent to a 5.4 drop in prices, with 1.7 percentage points 
coming from reduced markups and 3.7 percentage points from new varieties.  
In section 3, we introduce the translog expenditure function and solve for the ratio of 
expenditure functions (or exact price index) in the presence of new and disappearing goods, 
which allow the gains from new products to be measured. The pro-competitive effect of imports 
is discussed in section 4. Our analysis allows for multiple products supplied by each country, and 
shows how the Herfindahl indexes of export sales by each country enter into our equations. 
Significantly, we have been able to obtain these indexes for most countries selling to the U.S., by 
land or by sea. In section 5 we discuss the procedure for estimating the system of demand and 
pricing equations, and results are presented in section 6.    4
2.  Data Preview 
  One of the dramatic changes that globalization has wrought on the U.S. economy is the 
declining share of U.S. demand supplied by plants located in the U.S. To see this, we define U.S. 
domestic supply as aggregate U.S. sales less exports for agricultural, mining, and manufacturing 
goods (see the data Appendix for detailed definitions of all of our variables). We define U.S. 
apparent consumption as domestic supply plus imports. Similarly, we define the U.S. suppliers’ 
share of the U.S. market, as U.S. domestic supply divided by apparent consumption. Finally, we 
define each country’s U.S. import share as the exports from that country to the U.S. divided by 
apparent consumption.  
The switch in U.S. classification of output data from the SIC system to the NAICS in 
1998 makes it difficult to compare sectoral output levels between 1997 and 1998. We therefore 
break our sample into two periods (1992-1997 and 1998-2005) to maintain consistent series, and 
discuss how we handle this problem for the estimation in the appendix. For the initial tables, we 
will present the raw data drawn from two subsamples, but we will present results for both sub-
samples and the full sample in the results section.  
From Table 1 we see that the share of U.S. apparent consumption sourced domestically 
fell by a little more than 5 percentage points between 1992 and 1997 and by 9 percentage points 
between 1998 and 2005. This decline corresponds to an annual decline in the U.S. share of 1.4 
percentage points per year in the early period and 1.7 percentage points per year in the later 
period. The flip side of this decline was an almost doubling of the import share. Interestingly, the 
growth of imports was not uniform across countries: depending on the time period, between one-
half and two-thirds of the increase was due to increases in import shares from Canada, China, 
and Mexico – countries that were either growing rapidly or involved in free trade agreements.    5
  One possible explanation for the findings in Table 1 is that the rise in import penetration 
was confined to a few important sectors. We can examine whether this was the case by looking 
at more disaggregated data. In Figure 1, we plot the U.S. suppliers’ share in 1997 or 2005 against 
its level in 1992 or 1998, for each HS 4-digit category. We also place a 45-degree line in the plot 
so that one can easily see which sectors experienced gains in U.S. shares and which experienced 
declines. As one can see from the figure, the vast majority of sectors lie below the 45-degree 
line, meaning that import penetration was steadily expanding over this time period. This 
establishes that the rise in import penetration, though quite pronounced in some sectors, was a 
general phenomenon that was common across many merchandise sectors.  
Along with the declining U.S. market share in many sectors, there has also been an exit 
of manufacturing firms. The Department of Census data reveals that in 1992, there were 337,409 
firms in manufacturing. By 2002 this number had fallen to 309,696: an 8.2 percent decline. We 
will argue that this decline in the number of firms was also associated with an even larger decline 
in U.S. market share, resulting in not only a rise in imports but also a decline in the typical 
market share of a surviving U.S. firm. Thus, by 2005 the U.S. market was characterized by fewer 
domestic firms with smaller per-firm shares.  
To make this clear, it is convenient to work with Herfindahl indexes of market 
concentration, defined for each country selling to the U.S. We let i denote countries, j denote 
firms (each selling one product), k denote sectors and t denote time. Let 
ik
jt s denote firm j’s 
exports to the U.S. in sector k, as a share of country i’s total exports to the U.S. in that sector. 
Then the Herfindahl for country i is:       




Hs =  .   6
The inverse of a Herfindahl can be thought of as the “effective number” of exporters, or 
U.S. firms, in an industry. Thus, a Herfindahl of one implies that there is one firm in the industry 
and an index of 0.5 would arise if there were two equally sized firms in the sector. Similarly, if 
we multiply the Herfindahl by the share of the country’s suppliers in the market, one obtains the 
market share of a synthetic typical firm in the market. This is a very useful statistic because in 
many demand systems, the markup of the firm rises or falls with its market share, and this 
feature will also hold in our translog system. 
  In Table 1, we present average Herfindahls at the HS 4-digit level for the U.S. and for the 
10 major exporters to the U.S.
4 As one can see from the table, the average U.S. Herfindahl rose 
slightly over both sub-periods, indicating that increased foreign competition was likely 
associated with some exit of U.S. firms from the market. If we multiply this average Herfindahl 
by the share of each country i in the U.S. consumption of good k,  k
it s , we can compute the typical 
market share of a firm from that country,  kk
it it Hs. We report the weighted average of these per-
firm market shares in the last column of Table 1, where the weights are based on the importance 
of each sector in total U.S. consumption. Table 1 reveals that the share in the U.S. market of a 
typical U.S. firm fell slightly in the first period and by about 8 percent in the second period.  By 
contrast exporters to the U.S. appear to have gained market share in both periods In other words, 
those U.S. firms that survived ended up with smaller market shares individually while foreign 
firms gained market share, which is very much in line with predictions of trade liberalization in 
the presence of firm heterogeneity as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
5 
                                                 
4 For the U.S., we have adjusted the NAICS 6-digit Herfindahls from the Bureau of Economic Analysis data so that 
they match the HS 4-digit categories, and detail that procedure in the data Appendix. 
5 Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) describe the equilibrium as follows: “import competition increases competition in the 
domestic product market, shifting up residual demand price elasticities for all firms at any given demand level. This 
forces the least productive firms to exit. This effect is very similar to an increase in market size in the closed   7
  One can get a sense of what happened to concentration in other countries by plotting the 
average export Herfindahl in 2005 against its value in 1992 when we only include sectors for 
which we could compute a Herfindahl at the HS 4-digit level in both years. The results are 
shown in Figure 2. The Herfindahl index appears to have risen for most countries in the world 
indicating that the export market has become more concentrated over time. Nevertheless, the 
opposite trend seems to be true for many of the most important exporters to the U.S., as listed in 
Table 1 and labeled in Figure 2. With the exception of Japan, Mexico, and the United Kingdom, 
all of the remaining top ten exporters to the U.S. saw their export Herfindahls decline over this 
time period, indicating more exporting firms.  
The last row of Table 1 indicates what happened to the average Herfindahl index across 
markets and countries, as well as the market share of a firm supplying the U.S. market regardless 
of origin. In order to compute the latter, we multiply each country’s average firm’s market share 
by its share in the U.S. market, and sum across countries, obtaining  kk 2
it it iH( s)  , which is also 
averaged across sectors. As one can see from the table, the average firm’s market share of an HS 
4-digit sector fell by 0.9 percentage points in the first period and 1.9 percentage points in the 
second. These declines suggest that that market power moderated over both periods.  
Obviously, since we cannot measure export Herfindahls in cases where a country does 
not export, Table 1 and Figure 2 miss one of the most important sources of new competition: the 
entry of firms into sectors that contained no imports from a particular country previously. Broda 
and Weinstein (2006) have already extensively documented that this was an important force over 
                                                                                                                                                             
economy: the increased competition induces a downward shift in the distribution of markups across firms. Although 
only relatively more productive firms survive (with higher markups than the less productive firms who exit), the 
average markup is reduced. The distribution of prices shifts down due to the combined effect of selection and lower 
markups. Again, as in the case of larger market size in a closed economy, average firm size and products increase as 
does product variety. In this model, welfare gains from trade thus come from a combination of productivity gains 
(via selection), lower markups (pro-competitive effect), and increased product variety.”   8
the period we are examining, so we will not replicate their results except to say that the same 
forces are at play in our data. Between 1992 and 2005, there was a 54 percent increase in the 
number of country-HS-10-digit import categories with positive values, which is indicative of 
substantial foreign entry into new markets. It is the elimination of small U.S. suppliers in the face 
of the growth of these new foreign suppliers that is the basis of our attempt to quantify the 
impact foreign entry had on markups, and the number of varieties available for consumption.   
  This data preview suggests that prior work on the impact of new varieties is likely to 
suffer from a number of biases. First, as foreign firms have entered the U.S. market there has 
been exit by U.S. firms, which serves to offset some of the gains of new varieties. Second, while 
U.S. Herfindahls rose, the Herfindahls of many of our largest suppliers fell. This suggests that 
there may have been substantial variety growth that is not captured in industry level analyses. 
Finally, because the market shares of both U.S. firms and the average firm fell over this time 
period, the rise in foreign entry is likely to have depressed markups overall and therefore lowered 
prices. Thus, estimates of the gains from new varieties obtained from industry-level data using 
CES aggregators could either be too large if domestic exit is an important source of variety loss, 
or too small if foreign firm entry and market power losses are important unmeasured gains. We 
turn to quantifying these gains and losses in the next section.  
 
3. Translog Function 
  To introduce the translog function, we will initially simplify our notation above that 
distinguished countries, firms, and sectors, and instead just let the index i denote products (we 
will re-introduce countries and firms below). We consider a translog function defined over the 
universe of products, whose maximum number is denoted by the fixed number N ~ . The translog    9
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In order to further require that all goods enter “symmetrically” in the γij coefficients, we can  
impose the additional restrictions that: 
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It is readily confirmed that the restrictions in (3) satisfies the homogeneity conditions (2).  
The share of each good in expenditure can be computed by differentiating (1) with 
respect to i p ln , obtaining: 

=




j ij i i p ln s .        ( 4 )  
These shares must be non-negative, of course, but we will allow for a subset of goods to have 
zero shares because they are not available for purchase. To be precise, suppose that si > 0 for  
i=1,…,N, while sj = 0 for j=N+1,…, N
~ . Then for the latter goods, we set sj = 0 within the share 
equations (4), and use these  ) N N ~ ( −  equations to solve for the reservation prices  j p ~ , j=N+1,…,  
N
~ , in terms of the observed prices pi, i=1,…,N. Then these reservation prices  j p ~  should appear  
                                                 
6 The translog direct and indirect utility functions were introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975), and 
the expenditure function was proposed by Diewert (1976, p. 122).   10
within the expenditure function (1) for the unavailable goods j=N+1,…, N
~ .  
  In the presence of unavailable goods, then, the expenditure function becomes rather 
complex, involving reservation prices. However, if we consider the symmetric case defined by 
(3), then it turns out that the expenditure function can be simplified considerably, so that the 
reservation prices no longer appear explicitly. Specifically, Bergin and Feenstra (2009) show that 
the expenditure function is simplified as: 
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Notice that the expenditure function in (5) looks like a conventional translog function 
defined over the available goods i=1,…,N, while the symmetry restrictions in (6) hold analogous 
to (3), but using the number of available products N rather than  N. To interpret (7), it implies 
each of the coefficient αi is increased by the same amount to ensure that the coefficients ai sum 
to unity over i=1,…,N. The final term a0, appearing in (8), incorporates the coefficients αi of the 
unavailable products. If the number of available products N rises, then a0 falls, indicating a 
welfare gain from increasing the number of available products. As it is stated, however, (8) does 
not allow for the direct measurement of welfare gain because it depends on the unknown 
parameters αi. We now develop an alternative formula for the welfare gain that depends on the 
observable expenditures shares on goods, and can therefore be measured.   11
  Let us distinguish two periods t-1 and t, and re-introduce our notation that i denotes 
countries, while j denotes firms (each selling one good), so the pair (i, j) denotes a unique 
product variety. We assume that the countries i=M+1,…,  M  do not supply in either period, 
while the countries {1,…,M} are divided into two (overlapping) sets: the Mτ countries  τ ∈I i  sell 
in period τ = t-1,t; with union  t1 t II { 1 , . . . , M } − ∪=  and non-empty intersection  ∅ ≠ ∩ − t 1 t I I . We 
shall let  t1 t II I − ⊆∩  denote a non-empty subset of “common” countries supplying both periods. 
  Firms in each country provide the set of varieties  it jJ ∈ , with the number  it N0 > , so the  
total number of varieties available each period is 
t ti t iI NN
∈ ≡ . If a country supplies in period t 
but not t-1, then there is obviously an expansion in its set of varieties. But we can also measure  
an expansion in varieties by examining the Herfindahl indexes of exporting firms for countries 
supplying both periods: a reduction in the Herfindahl indicates greater variety. For our next 
result, we will need to specify a set of countries  I i∈  for which variety does not expand; in 
practice, we identify these countries by their (relatively) constant Herfindahl indexes. For these  
countries we assume that there is unchanging sets of variety, it i JJ ≡  for  I i∈ , with the number  
i N 0 >  in each country, so the total number of unchanging product varieties is  i iI NN
∈ ≡ .  
With this notation, the shares  ijt s are now used in place of sit in all our earlier formulas.  
We can decompose these product shares as  it
i
jt ijt s s s = , where 
it it ijt jJ ss
∈ =  denotes the share of 
expenditure on all varieties from country i, and  it ijt
i
jt s / s s ≡  denote the expenditure share on 




∈ =  . In practice, we only observe the  
U.S. import shares sit by country, while we will make inferences about the firm shares  i
jt s  using  
the Herfindahl indexes of concentration for each country and product.   12
Returning to the expenditure function, the Törnqvist price index is exact for the translog 
function (Diewert, 1976), which means that the ratio of the unit-expenditure functions is 
measured by: 
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where  1 it it i J J J − ∪ ≡  is the set of product varieties sold by country i over both periods. Of 
course, some of those products may be available in only one period, and likewise, some of the 
countries i = 1,…,M are selling in only one period. In such cases we again solve for the 
reservation prices for goods not available, by setting their respective shares equal to zero. 
Substituting these reservation prices back into (9) and simplifying, we obtain the following 
expression for the exact price index: 
 
Theorem 1 
Then the ratio of translog unit-expenditure functions can be written as: 
i
t 1
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          ≡− − + −      γ          
      (12) 
where   ∈ ≡
it J j
2 i
jt it ) s ( H  denotes the Herfindahl index for firm exports by country i. 
Proof: See Appendix 
   13
  To interpret this result, notice that the constructed shares  τ ij s  apply to the N products 
that are available in both periods. The constructed shares simply take the observed shares  τ ij s  
and additively increase each of them by an amount such that  ij s τsum to unity across N products. 
This transformation of shares means that the term 
i
1
ijt ijt 1 ijt ijt 1 2 iI jJ (s s )(lnp lnp ) −− ∈∈ +−     
appearing in (10) is the Törnqvist price index defined over products available in both periods.
7 
The term V defined in (12) is therefore the extra impact on the exact price index from having the 
new and disappearing varieties, and depends on their squared shares, as indicated by the 
Herfindahl indexes and the country shares sit.  
There is one feature of the formula for V that deserves special attention. The first term in 
curly brackets in (12) is the change in 
2
it it iI H( s)
∉  , summed over those countries not in the 
set I . An increase in the Herfindahl index from one of these countries, ceteris paribus, would 
raise the variety gain V in absolute value, which is surprising because an increase in the 
Herfindahl indicates fewer exporting firms. The resolution to this puzzle is that the ceteris 
paribus phrase cannot be applied if some exporting firms exit: in that case, there would also be a 
fall in the market share for that country. The formula in (12) must incorporate the change in 
market share along with the change in the Herfindahl to give an accurate result for welfare. 
To illustrate this point with an example, consider the opposite case where there is a rise in 
the number of suppliers and a fall in the Herfindahl. Specifically, consider a simple example with 
U.S. consumers purchasing Budweiser and Heineken in period 1, and then having a new 
domestic variety called American Ale available in period 2.
8 For simplicity, the varieties 
                                                 
7  Actually, the  N  products are a subset of those available both periods, since  I  can be a proper subset of the 
countries i supplying both periods. 
8 American Ale is a new product from the Budweiser company, but we will suppose in our example that this product 
is being sold by another U.S. firm.   14
available each period sell in equal shares. The U.S. market share then rises from sus1 = 1/2  in 
period 1 to sus2 = 2/3 in period 2, with Herfindahl indexes Hus1 =1 in period 1 and Hus2 = 1/2 in 
period 2 (since then there are two equally sized firms). The change in the U.S. Herfindahl 
indicates a potential change in variety, so the U.S. is country iI ∉ . In contrast, the Netherlands 
has unchanged variety (i.e. Heineken), so it is country I i∈ , and so N1 = . Using this information 
in (12) we obtain, 
22 22 11 2 1 1 2 1
V
22 32N 32
11 1 7 1 1
0.
23 6 N 3 6 2 6
          =− − + −          γ             
     =− − + =− <      γγ     
 
The negative value for V lowers the exact price index in (10) and indicates the gain from product 
variety. Notice that to obtain this negative value, however, we need to incorporate the second 
term within curly brackets in (12) and above, which is positive; the first bracketed term is 
negative, reflecting the fall in the U.S. Herfindahl, and on its own would give the wrong sign for 
the variety gain. So to evaluate V we need to have an accurate value for N, which in practice we 
will measure by the sum of the inverse Herfindahls indexes for countries iI ∈ , i.e. countries 
whose Herfindahl indexes do not change by more than some specified tolerance over time.
9 
We conclude with two final observations on V. First, we should not interpret this as the 
“total” welfare effect of new goods, independently of the Törnqvist index appearing in equation 
(10). Rather, new goods will also contribute to lower prices for existing goods: this is the pro-
competitive effect that we described in the Introduction. Accordingly, we will refer to V as a 
“partial” welfare effect of new goods; the “total” impact will also have to take into account the  
pro-competitive effect.  
                                                 
9  In our robustness checks we will change the tolerance used to include countries in the “common” set  I or not.   15
  Second, in order to measure V in (12) we need an estimate of γ. This parameter plays a 
similar role as the elasticity of substitution in the CES case, in that the welfare gains are reduced 
as either parameter rises. Obviously, we cannot compare the CES and translog cases without 
knowledge of these parameters.
10 In both cases, the parameters are estimated from the demand 
equations. For the translog case, the share equation is obtained by differentiating (5), using (6) 
and (7), and re-introducing our notation for countries i and firms j, as: 
  ijt s  =  () ij t ijt t () l n p l n p α+ α − γ −  ,         
where 
ti t ti j iI jJ (1 )
∈∈ α= − α   is a time-effect which ensures that 
ti t ij t iI jJ() 1




ti j t N iI jJ lnp lnp
∈∈ =   is the average log-price of all available goods in period t.
11  
 Using  it
i
jt ijt s s s =  and multiplying the share equation by  i
jt s , it becomes: 
it
2 i
jt s ) s (  =  ()
ii i
jt ij t jt ijt jt t s ( ) s lnp s lnp α+ α − γ −  .         
Summing this equation over  it J j∈ , and noting that  1 s
it J j
i
jt =  ∈ ,we obtain: 
it its H  =  () it t it t lnp lnp α+ α− γ −   ,          (13) 
where  ∈ ≡
it J j ijt
i
jt it p ln s p ln  is the (weighted) geometric mean of prices, and 
it
i
it jt ij jJs
∈ α≡ α    
is a (weighted) mean of the taste parameters. This average taste parameter will change as the set 
of selling firms shifts towards those with higher demand. We therefore model the movement in 
these tastes parameters as: 
                                                 
10  Feenstra and Shiells (1997, p. 258) compare the gains from a single new good in the CES and translog cases, by 
assuming that the new good has the same elasticity of demand in both cases. They show that the “partial” welfare 
gain from the new good in the translog case is about one-half of the welfare gain in the CES case.  
11  We have included a time subscript on the parameter αt because it depends on the set of varieties available, which 
changes over time. 
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     it i it α= α+ ε,         ( 1 4 )  
where  it ε  is an error term. Substituting (14) into (13), we obtain the share equations, 
   it its H  =  () it i t ti t lnp lnp α+ α− γ −+ ε  .          (15) 
The parameter γ is obtained by estimating (15), recognizing that the intercept term differs 
across i and also over time, reflecting changes in the number of available goods. The important 
properties of these share equation is that the parameter γ does not depend on the set of goods 
available. However, we can expect that the price appearing in (15) are endogenous, as in a 
conventional supply and demand system. For the CES case, Feenstra (1994) showed how this 
endogeneity could be overcome without the use of conventional instrument variables, but by 
exploiting heteroskedasticity in second-moments of the data. We will follow the same procedure 
in the translog case, as described in section 5. But first, we need to solve for the optimal prices 
charged by imperfectly competitive firms, in the next section.  
 
4.  Optimal Prices and the Pro-Competitive Effect 
We will suppose that the available products are produced by single-product firms, acting 
as Bertrand competitors. The profit maximization problem for firm j in country i is, 
   
ijt
max
i j t i jt t i ji jt t p p x (p,E ) C [x (p,E )] − ,       
where  ij t t x( p, E)  denotes the demand arising from the translog system, with the price vector pt 
and expenditure Et, and Cijt =  ij ij t t C[ x( p, E) ] denotes the costs of production. We denote the 
elasticity of demand by  ij t t ij t t ijt (p ,E ) lnx (p ,E )/ lnp η≡ − ∂ ∂   Then the optimal price can be 
written as the familiar markup over marginal costs:   17
ij t t
ijt ij ij t t
ij t t
(p ,E )
pC ' [ x ( p , E ) ]
(p ,E ) 1
  η
=  
η −    
.      ( 1 6 )  
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+   γ− 
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Substituting these equations into (16), we obtain:  







+   γ−  
,      ( 1 7 )  
where  ijt ij ij t t C' C '[x (p ,E )] ≡  denotes the time-dependent marginal costs. 
  We aggregate this equation across firms in each country by multiplying by 
i
jt s  and 
summing over j: 
   
it
i




lnp lnC' s ln 1
(N 1) ∈
 
=+ +  
γ−    
 ,      ( 1 8 )  
where  it p ln  is again the geometric mean of prices, and  ijt J j
i
jt it ' C ln s ' C ln
it  ∈ ≡  is the geometric 
mean of marginal costs in country i. In order to evaluate this expression, we need to bring the  
summation (like an expectation) within the log expression, which means that we are ignoring 
Jensen’s inequality; we argue below that this is a second-order approximation.
12 In that case, we 
obtain the final form of our pricing equation: 
                                                 
12  Note that we need to make this approximation due to missing data at the firm level. For the United States, for 




jt jt it t jJ it it t
it it it
tt
s( ss) N HsN
lnp lnC' ln 1 lnC' ln 1
(N 1) (N 1)
∈
    =+ + ≈+ +    γ− γ−   

.   (19)   
  The pro-competitive effect is obtained by substituting the pricing equation (19) into (10). 
The resulting expression involves both share-weighted and unweighted geometric means of the 
firm prices, because the shares  τ ij s  in (11) are additive transformations of the shares  τ ij s . In 
practice we will not be able to distinguish weighted and unweighted firm prices, and simply use 
import unit-values for either. So to eliminate this distinction in the theory, we strengthen our 
earlier assumption that countries supplying in both periods have unchanging sets of 
variety, i it J J ≡  for  I i∈ . Specifically, we now assume that if there is no entry or exit of firms in 
a country, then the firm shares are equal and unchanging within that country: 







τ = , for  I i∈ , τ  =  t-1,t.     (20) 
Notice that the country shares sit still change for countries selling in both periods, so that (20)  
specifies that firms within these countries  I i∈  do not change size relative to their country sales. 
In that case, the pro-competitive effect is written as follows: 
 
Theorem 2 
For iI , ∈  the pricing equation (19) is a second-order approximation to (18) around the point 
where sitNt/γ(Nt –1)=0 and (20) holds. Then using (19) and (20), the pro-competitive effect P is: 
P V ) ' C ln ' C )(ln s s (
e
e
ln 1 it it 1 it it 2
1
I i 1 t







∈ −  ,      









≡+ −   
 
 ,  for  I i∈  and  τ = t-1, t,  and,   19
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     ≡+ + − +     γ− γ −       .    (21) 
Using  x ) x 1 ln( ≈ + , the pro-competitive effect is approximated as: 
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   
≈+ − + + −     γ γ− −      . (22) 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
  Equation (21) is the final form for the pro-competitive impact that we will evaluate, while 
(22) provides use with some intuition on this term: the pro-competitive effect lowers the exact 
price index by more that the partial variety effect whenever the additional terms on the right of 
(22) are negative. Focusing on the second term on the right, we can see that the pro-competitive 
effect lowers the price index by more than the partial variety effect provided that 
M 2
it it i1 Hs
=   is 
falling over time. It is useful to give a more precise interpretation to that term. Recalling that the 
Herfindahl indexes are 
it
i2
it jt jJ H( s )
∈ ≡ , we see that: 
it it
MM M
2i 2 2 2 k
it it jt it ijt t
i1 i1 jJ i1 jJ
Hs ( s)s s H
== ∈ = ∈
== ≡     .      ( 2 3 )  
In words, the sum of the Herfindahl firm indexes weighted by the squared country shares, on the 
left of (23), is exactly the right way to aggregate these indexes to obtain an overall Herfindahl 
for the good k in question, on the right of (23). This summary statistic was shown in the last row 
and column of each panel in Table 1, when averaged across sectors. We therefore see that a 
falling overall Herfindahl contributes to lowering prices through the pro-competitive impact, as 
we suggested in our data preview in section 2.  
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5. Estimation and Results 
We turn now to estimation of the translog parameter γ.  We will specify that the weighted 
average of marginal costs from each exporting country take on the iso-elastic form: 







=ω +ω +δ  
 
,        
where the term  ) p / E s ( it t it  reflects the total quantity exported from country i,  and  it δ  is an error 
term. Substituting into (19), we obtain a modified pricing equation: 
   + ω + ω + ω = ω + t it 0 i it E ln s ln p ln ) 1 ( it
t
t it it
) 1 N (
N s H







+ .   (24) 
We see that the translog parameter γ appears in both the share equation (15) and the pricing 
equation (24): larger γ means that the goods are stronger substitutes and the markups are 
correspondingly smaller. It is also evident that the shares and prices are endogenously 
determined: shocks to either supply δit or demand εit will both be correlated with shares sit and 
prices pit. To control for this endogeneity will we estimate these equations simultaneously using 
a similar methodology to that proposed in the CES case by Feenstra (1994) and extended by 
Broda and Weinstein (2006).  
  The first step in our estimation is to difference (15) and (24) with respect to country k and 
with respect to time, thereby eliminating the terms αi + αt and the overall average prices  t p ln  
appearing in the share equations, and eliminating total expenditure t E ln . We also divide the 
share equation by γ and the pricing equation by  ) 1 ( ω + , and then express each equation in terms 
of its error term: 
    =
γ
ε Δ − ε Δ ) ( kt it    ) p ln p ln (
)] s H ( ) s H ( [
kt it
kt kt it it Δ − Δ +
γ
Δ − Δ
,   21
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We multiply these two equations together, and average the resulting equation over time, to obtain 
the estimating equation: 





























= , (25) 
where the over-bar indicates that we are averaging that variable over time, and: 
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  We shall assume that the error terms in demand and the pricing equation are uncorrelated, 
which means that the error term in (25) becomes small,  0 ui →  in probability limit as  ∞ → T . 
That error term is therefore uncorrelated with any of the right-hand side variables as  ∞ → T , and 
we can exploit those moment conditions by simply running OLS on (25). Feenstra (1994) shows 
that procedure will give us consistent estimates of γ and ω in a slightly simpler system, provided   22
that the right-hand side variables in (25) are not perfectly collinear as  ∞ → T . As in the CES 
case of Feenstra (1994), that condition will be assured if there is some heteroskedasticity in the 
error terms across countries i, so that the right-hand side variables in (25) are not perfectly 
collinear. More efficient estimates can be obtained by running weighted least squares on (25).  
Before proceeding with the estimation, we had to solve a number of data problems. First, 
while in principle we could have estimated γ at the 10-digit level, in practice this is not possible 
because we do not have enough 10-digit varieties in most sectors. In order to make sure that we 
had enough data to obtain precise estimates, we decided to assume that the γ’s at the 10-digit 
level within an HS-4-digit sector were the same. This assumption meant that we typically had 99 
varieties when we estimated a γ for an HS-4 sector.  
A second complication arises because we have U.S. shipments data at the NAICS-6 digit 
level but we need to compute shares at the HS-10 digit level. Thus, we had to allocate NAICS-6 
production data to each HS-10 sector. In order to do this, we assumed that the share of U.S. 
production in each HS-10 was the same as that of the U.S. in the NAICS-6 digit sector that 
contains it, as discussed in the data Appendix.  
A third complication arises because we use unit-values of import prices from each source 
country rather than the geometric mean, which introduces measurement error, especially for 
import flows that are very small. Broda and Weinstein (2006) propose a weighting scheme based 
on the quantity of imports at the HS-10 level. Unfortunately, we could not implement precisely 
that scheme because the U.S. quantity indexes were defined at the NAICS-6 digit level and not at 
the HS-10 digit level. We therefore decided to implement the Broda and Weinstein weighting 
scheme using value of shipments instead of quantity of shipments, since shipment values are 
likely to be highly correlated with shipment quantities across countries.    23
Finally, as in Broda and Weinstein (2006), we also faced the problem that only 86 
percent of our estimates of γ had the right sign if we estimate them without constraints. If γ is 
less than zero, then this implies that demand is inelastic and the welfare gains associated with 
new and disappearing varieties are infinite. Since we wanted to rule this out and because the 
formula for V is very sensitive to small values of γ, we decided to place a constraint on γ limiting 
it to have a smallest value of 0.05. In order to do this, we used a grid search procedure over γ and 
ω to minimize the sum squared errors in equation (25). In this procedure we set an initial γ of 
0.05 and increased it by 5 percent over the range [.05, 110].
13 Similarly, we set an initial ω of -5 
and increased it by 0.1 over the range [-5, 15].  
 
Plots of the Data 
  Equations (12) and (21) or (22) are the key equations for understanding how new 
varieties affect consumers through increased choice and lower markups. Before we present the 
final results, it is worth going through a decomposition of the components so that we can 
understand the forces at play.  
We begin with the partial variety effect, V, in (12). Its coefficient 1/2γ captures the fact 
that consumers care more about goods that are less elastically demanded (i.e. have low γ’s) than 
goods that have close substitutes. The term in curly brackets in (12) can be understood by 
breaking it up into its components. First, Hiτsiτ is the typical firm’s market share. In order to 
compute the aggregate impact of variety creation and destruction, we need to aggregate these, 
but the aggregation process places more weight on goods that have higher market shares than  
                                                 
13 In order to speed up the grid searches, in most specifications we increased the interval by 5 percent until 7.8 and 
then jumped to 109.9. We did this because we almost never found gammas between 7.8 and 109.9. Moreover, 
making this change did not qualitatively affect the results because all high gammas imply very small markups and 
variety effects.    24
those with lower shares. As a result, we aggregate these across varieties by weighting them by siτ 
and create  2
ii iI Hs ττ ∉  . Essentially, the partial variety effect will have a negative effect on the  
price level if the market share of new entrants is, on average, larger than that of firms that exit. 
Likewise, the second term in curly brackets measures the country share of new suppliers versus 
disappearing supplies. Thus, equation (12) indicates that the partial variety effect will be driven 
by how important new varieties are in demand.  
Before we turn to the estimation, we can obtain some intuition for the expected results by 
plotting the distribution of 2γV, which corresponds to the negative of the term in curly brackets 
in (12). Since γ > 0, the sign of the variety gain, V, will be the same as the sign of 2γV but 
requires no estimation. Since we simply observe Herfindahls and not firm-level data, we decided 
to define a new variety as the appearance or disappearance of an HS-10 digit export from a 
country or whenever the Herfindahl in 2005 relative to that in 1992 fell within the range of 
[1/1.3, 1.3]. We will explore the robustness of our results to this criterion later, but this seems 
like a reasonable starting point. Thus, the countries iI ∈  in each sector are those that export the 
U.S. in both years and have the Herfindahl ratio in that range. Figure 3a plots the distribution of 
2γV. The distribution is fairly symmetric although there appears to be a slightly negative mass.
14 
Indeed, both the median and the mean are negative (-0.03 and -1.1 percent).  
We can use a similar technique to understand the distribution of the pro-competitive 
effect, P. If we multiply both sides of equation (22) by 2γ > 0, we can write 2γP as a function of 
2γV and two terms that are composed of Herfindahl indexes. The second of these terms is a 
decreasing function of the number of firms in the sector. If we assume the number of firms is 
                                                 
14 There are a few larger positive and negative outliers that we do not show in any version of Figure 3 because they 
would compress the distribution too much. All of our results are robust to dropping the top and bottom 1 percent of 
the V distribution.    25
large, then this term will be close to zero and we can ignore it for now (even though we will 
include it when we compute P in the next section). This simplification enables us to now write 
2γP as purely a function of the raw data. We plot this distribution in Figure 3b. As one can see 
from the histogram, the distribution of 2γP is much more sharply shifted to the left. The median 
and mean are – 0.05 and – 1.2 percent respectively, suggesting fairly substantial pro-competitive 
effects (as long as γ is not too large).  
Finally, Figure 3c plots the distribution of 
M 22
it it it 1 it 1 i1 (H s H s ) −− = −   which corresponds to  
2γ(P – V), once again assuming for the moment the last term in equation (22) is approximately 
zero. This value tells us how changes in market Herfindahls alone affected markups. Again the 
mass of this distribution is greater to the left of the zero indicating that firm market shares fell on 
average during this period. This suggests that the decline in the typical firm’s market share put 
downward pressure on prices.  
Thus, even before we turn to the estimation, the data suggests that consumers of 
merchandise were likely to have benefited from increased variety, as indicated by the sign of 
2γV, and a decline in markups, as indicated by the sign of 2γP. In order to understand the impact 
of these changes on welfare, however, we need to estimate γ for each sector and aggregate.  
 
Estimation Results 
  Because we ultimately estimated over one thousand γ’s, it is not possible to display all of 
them here. We display the sample statistics for γ in Table 2. The median γ was 0.19 and the 
average was 12. The large average γ is driven by the fact that their distribution is not symmetric 
and γ can take on very large values. It is difficult to have strong priors for what a reasonable 
value of γ should be. One way possible benchmark is the implied markup. We can compute the   26
markup for each industry by using equation (19). Based on this calculation the median estimated 
markup in our data is 0.30 (i.e. a 30% markup over marginal costs) in 2005. By comparison,  
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) estimate markups across U.S. manufacturing and 
obtain an average markup of 0.37, which is a bit higher than ours but not dramatically different 
especially given the large differences in data and estimating procedures.  
The markups in each sector depend on the value of the firm’s market share as well. We 
can get some sense of the reasonableness of our estimates by looking at the most important 
sectors in U.S. absorption. In Table 3, we report the share of U.S. absorption from the ten largest 
sectors (with names not beginning with “other”), where we define the share to be the average 
share of absorption in 1992 and 2005. In the first column we report our estimate of γ. Based on 
this measure, we find the three sectors where the products are most heterogeneous and firms are 
likely to have the most market power are “Aircraft and Spacecraft,” “Televisions, Video 
Cameras, and Receivers,” and “Private Motor Vehicles.” In contrast, the most homogeneous 
sectors where firms are likely to have the least market power are “Crude Petroleum,” “Natural 
Gas,” and “Cigarettes and Cigars.” This pattern seems broadly sensible.   
  We now are ready to present aggregate estimates of P and V for all merchandise  
consumed in the U.S. In order to do this, we aggregated P and V computed at the HS-4 level  
using the formula: 
  11
kt kt 1 k kt kt 1 k 22
kk
ˆˆ P (s s )P  and V (s s )V −− =+ =+   (26) 
where we reintroduce the sector subscript k, and hence Pk and Vk are the values for P and V 
computed at the HS-4 level and skτ is the share of that sector in U.S. absorption. Our baseline 
estimate for P and V are -0.017 and -.037, which means that the welfare gain due to the decline 
in markups is 1.7 percent and the partial gain from varieties is about 3.7 percent. These numbers   27
are recorded in the first row of Table 4. Thus, the combined impact is to lower the U.S. 
merchandise price index by 5.4 percent between 1992 and 2005. Given that U.S. merchandise 
demand constituted 18.5 percent of GDP in 2002, this corresponds to a 1.0 percent gain for U.S. 
consumers.
15 Of this gain, 0.31 percentage points comes from lower markups and the remaining 
0.69 percentage points comes from the partial variety effect.  
  We can obtain some intuition for these numbers by returning to the results we presented 
in the discussion of Figures 4a and 4b. There, we found that the mean value of 2γV was -1.1 
percent and the mean value of 2γP was -1.2 percent. If we simply apply our median estimates of 
γ to these numbers, we would obtain a partial variety impact on prices of -2.9 percent and partial 
markup effect of -3.2 percent and therefore an aggregate impact of -6.1 percent. This is 
somewhat larger than the -5.4 percent we estimate and suggests that full distribution of γ’s serves 
to lower our point estimate of the welfare gains due to new varieties and lower markups, but that 
our results are not being driven by an outlier value of γ.  
  Obviously one concern is the precision of our estimates. Because of the nonlinearity and 
our grid search algorithm, computation of the confidence intervals for P and V is not 
straightforward. We decided to compute these by bootstrapping each of the 1000 γ’s and ω’s and 
then using these bootstrapped parameter values to compute the distribution of P and V. This is 
enormously computationally intensive, but ultimately we were able to compute P and V 100 
times.
16 In our baseline case, we found that the 10-90 percent confidence interval for P was        
[-0.020, -.015] while the same interval for V was [-.056, -0.18].  This indicates that our point  
estimates for the markup and variety effects are estimated with reasonable precision.  
 
                                                 
15 We define merchandise demand as U.S. GDP in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing less exports plus imports 
in those sectors.  
16 It took 10 days on an 8-processor SPARCstation.   28
Robustness Tests 
One surprising feature of our welfare estimates so far is the relative ranking of P and V. 
Following Theorem 2 we argued that if 
M 2
it it i1 Hs
=   
is falling, indicating that sector k is 
becoming more competitive, then we should have Pk < Vk < 0, so the pro-competitive effect is 
more important than the partial variety effect in lowering prices. Averaging over sectors we 
found that 
M 2
it it i1 Hs
=   was indeed falling, as shown in Table 1 (entry in last row and column of 
each panel) and in Figure 3c (which has a negative mean). But when we apply the estimates of γk 
in each sector to compute Pk and Vk, and then average across sectors, we find that   ˆ V <  ˆ P  < 0, 
so the variety effect exceeds the pro-competitive effect.  
To explain this reversal of the ranking, we looked at which U.S. sectors were causing 
most of the variety gains. We find that of the 2.9 percentage point drop in merchandise prices 
due to new varieties, 2.4 percentage points was due to a single sector: new automobile and truck 
varieties. Between 1992 and 2005, there was enormous entry into this sector as Japanese car 
makers set up new plants (see Blonigen and Soderbery (2009)). This entry had two important 
impacts. First, the U.S. Herfindahl index declined sharply from 0.35 to 0.21, reflecting the large 
increase in the number of makers operating in the U.S. Second, the transplant of Japanese car 
makers to the U.S. was associated with a very large increase in U.S. automobile production: real 
output of autos made in the U.S. grew by 41 percent between 1992 and 1998, which contributed 
to a substantial increase in the share of U.S. consumption made domestically. That increase in 
the share resulted in a very large welfare gain, or drop in V, from equation (12). 
There are reasons to believe, however, that our welfare formula cannot accurately deal 
with the transplant of Japanese varieties to the United States: we have ignored multi-product   29
firms, for example, and in the same way have assumed that the γ estimate for autos applies 
equally well to products across firms as to products within firms. That assumption clearly 
contradicts the theoretical literature on multi-product firms, which makes a strong distinction 
between consumer substitution of products within and between firms (see Allanson and 
Montagna, 2005, and Bernard, et al 2006a,b). For this reason we also computed the aggregate 
values for  ˆ P  and  ˆ V while ignoring the passenger vehicle sector. This gives the result shown in 
the second row of Table 4, where both the pro-competitive and partial variety gains are 0.13, or 
welfare gains of 1.3 percentage points each. The sum of these is only one-half as big as our 
benchmark estimates, and now the pro-competitive and partial variety effects are of roughly 
equal magnitude.  
  In Table 4 we present some additional robustness tests of estimated impacts. The next 
robustness check consists of varying the sensitivity of the estimates to the cutoff Herfindahl we 
use to determine whether a country is in the set  I  or not, i.e. whether it is a “common’ country 
in both time periods with unchanged exporting firms. In our baseline case we examined 
fluctuations in the Herfindahl of [1/1.3, 1.3], but we also examined fluctuations of as tight as 
[1/1.1, 1.1] and as loose as [1/1.5, 1.5]. These are reported in the next four rows of Table 4. 
Theoretically, our results in Theorems 1 and 2 hold for any nonempty set  tt 1 III − ⊆∩ , and for 
this reason we might expect our aggregate estimates to be invariant to this  I  cutoff. In practice, 
the sensitivity arises for a number of reasons. First, as we tighten the Herfindahl criterion we lose 
some sectors because we no longer have any “common” countries, and so Theorem 1 cannot be 
applied in those sectors. For example, there are 21 more sectors when we use a criterion of 
[1/1.3, 1.3] than when we use [1/1.1, 1.1]. Secondly, our estimation relies on the assumption that 
the number of firms equals the inverse of the Herfindahl, which is not exact.     30
  The fact that V tends to rise and then fall in Table 4 as we change the cutoff can be 
explained by looking at the second term in curly brackets in (12). If we have a very tight cutoff 
for “common” countries, then a large share of the trade flows will be new or disappearing and 
the corresponding shares of new and disappearing goods in the second term will both approach 
one. Thus V will tend to be small because the difference between two squared share terms will 
approach zero. If the cutoff is very loose, however, then this will mean that the number of 
common firms, N, will be large and V will also tend to be small. Thus, the partial variety effect 
is dependent on the cutoff we choose. Still, it is remarkable how stable our estimates are to 
variation whether we count countries as entering or exiting particular sectors. 
  We also wanted to ensure that our efforts to concord the SIC sectors with the NAICS 
sectors was not driving the results. To check this, we split the sample into two periods 1992-1997 
and 1998-2005 and reran the estimation for each period. We then summed the markup and 
variety effects estimated over each period and report them in the second-last row of Table 4. As 
one can see from the table, whether we use the merged data or work with different subsamples 
does not have a large impact on our results. We still obtain an aggregate impact on merchandise 
prices of 5 percent, of which two thirds is driven by variety gains (including passenger vehicles).  
 
Comparison with CES Case 
  Our baseline estimate of the impact of new goods and changing markups on prices is 5.4 
percent, although depending on the cutoff for common goods this estimate can be as low as 3.9 
percent (or 2.6 percent without autos), as shown in the first various rows of Table 4. The 
magnitudes of these numbers are perhaps easiest to understand relative to Broda and Weinstein’s 
(2006) estimates for the period 1990 to 2001. Those authors used a CES aggregator and obtained 
a gain to consumers of 0.8 percent over the 1990-2001 period. That is slightly larger than the   31
0.69 benchmark percent estimate of pure variety gain in this paper, and slightly below our 
aggregate estimate of 1.0 percent. But the two estimates are not directly comparable for three 
reasons: first, Broda and Weinstein used both a different functional form (CES); second, they 
assumed that there was no firm entry or exit in sectors in which a country exported in the 
beginning and end of the sample; and third, they estimated the gain over 11 years instead of 13. 
If we multiply our estimates by 11/13, we find that implied aggregate gain over an 11-year 
period in the translog case is also 0.8. This suggests that both functional forms yield surprisingly 
similar aggregate welfare gains.  
  Nevertheless there are some important differences. In particular, while the CES 
aggregator ascribes all of the welfare gain to new varieties, the partial impact of new varieties in 
the translog case is 69 percent of the total gains in our benchmark translog estimates, or one-third 
smaller than in the CES case. We can obtain some sense of how important the pure functional 
form assumptions are by setting the Herfindahls of all countries equal to their 1992 values and 
recalculating the variety gain. In this case, we are assuming, as in Feenstra (1994) and Broda and 
Weinstein (2006), that the only source of new varieties is the entry and exit of exporting 
countries in each product market. Eliminating the impact of firm entry and exit within sectors 
gives us a variety impact on the price level of 0.4 percent – only an eighth as large as before – as 
shown in the last row of Table 4. While this causes measured variety gains to be much smaller, it 
also causes measured drops in markups to be much larger because there is no exit in response to 
foreign entry. When we fix Herfindahls to their 1992 level, the aggregate drop in prices is 3.2 
percent – almost double what is was before. In other words, the translog functional form ascribes 
a smaller role for variety than the CES, but we obtain comparable results in this paper to that of 
Broda and Weinstein (2006) because variety growth also has important impacts on markups in a    32
translog setup that are not permitted in the CES framework. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
Krugman (1979) demonstrated the reduction in markups that accompanies trade 
liberalization under monopolistic competition. That reduction in markups is not just a consumer 
gain, but is also a social gain: the reduction in markups in a zero-profit equilibrium indicates that 
the wedge between firm’s marginal and average costs is reduced, so that output is expanding and 
there are greater economies of scale. So the competition between firms from different countries 
is an important channel by which international trade leads to social gains. 
Despite this insight, such a channel has received only limited attention in the empirical 
trade literature. We have argued that the reason for this gap in the literature is the common 
assumption of CES preferences, which leads to constant markups. So instead we must look to 
alternative preferences, of which the quadratic preferences in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) are a 
leading example. On empirical grounds we have adopted instead translog preferences, simplified 
to impose symmetry in substitution across products. We have derived quite general formulas for 
the welfare gains from new products with these preferences, and also the pro-competitive effect 
of new entry on reducing markups. These formulas allow for multiple countries with firms that 
are heterogeneous in their marginal costs, and nearly any pattern of exit and entry, subject to the 
identifying assumption that some countries have unchanged sets of firms over time. 
The translog preferences lead to log-linear demand and pricing equations, which we 
estimate jointly. In this respect we are following the general approach of the industrial 
organization literature (Bresnahan, 1989; Berry, 1994): markups are not observed directly 
because marginal costs are not observed, so we rely on estimates of the elasticity of demand to 
identify the markups. But unlike the industrial organization literature, we are not interested here   33
in a single market, but rather, in estimating the impact of globalization on markups for an entire 
economy – the United States. To address the simultaneity of supply and demand across so many 
markets, we rely on the “identification through heteroskedasticity” approach used by Feenstra 
(1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006), and extended here from the CES to the translog setting. 
The tremendous amount of entry of foreign countries into U.S. markets, as well as more 
exporters within those countries, drives our measure of the variety gains. This entry has been 
offset to some degree by the exit of firms from the United States, leading to a rise in those 
Herfindahl indexes. Nevertheless, we find that the exit from the U.S. market has been less than 
the new entry, in the sense that the rise in U.S. Herfindahls is less that the fall the overall U.S. 
share, so that the per-firm share of surviving U.S.. firms fell in many sectors. That feature of the 
data drives our estimates of the fall in markups, which is the pro-competitive effect of 
globalization.  
In our benchmark results, we find that total welfare gain from globalization for the U.S. 
in the translog case is of the same magnitude as that found by Broda and Weinstein (2006) in the 
CES case, but that the composition of this gain is different. In theory, we could expect the pro-
competitive effect to be larger than the welfare gain from new varieties, but in our benchmark 
estimates the opposite ranking occurs: the pro-competitive effect was about one-third of the total 
gain and the variety effect was two-thirds. But that result is sensitive to one very large sector, 
passenger motor vehicles, without which the two sources of gain are about equal in size. So we 
conclude that while translog preferences give variety gains at least one-third lower than in the 
CES case, the additional pro-competitive effect can plausibly lead to similar overall gains from 
globalization under the two functional forms.  34
Appendix A: Proofs of Theorems 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
For convenience we denote the firm-country pairs (i,j) instead by just the product index i, 
where products i=1,…,N are available in period t-1 or t. These are divided into two (overlapping) 
sets: the products  τ ∈I i  sell in period τ = t-1,t; with their union  t1 t I I {1,...,N} − ∪=  and non-
empty intersection  ∅ ≠ ∩ − t 1 t I I  . We shall let  ∅ ≠ ∩ ⊆ − t 1 t I I I  denote any non-empty subset 
of their intersection, and without loss of generality we order the goods so that the first  1 N  goods 
denoted i=1,…, N1 are in I, and therefore available both periods (N1 equals N as used in the 
text); while the next N2 goods denoted i= N1+1,…,N are available in either one or both periods, 
but are not in I. These two categories exhaust the N goods, N= N1+N2. The expenditure function 
is as shown in equations (5) – (8), and Törnqvist price index is, 
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  Let B denote the NxN matrix B =  + γ − N I NxN L ) N / (γ , where IN is the NxN identity 
matrix and LN is an NxN matrix with all elements equal to unity. We partition the B matrix into 






















The diagonal elements in the matrix B are B
kk =  ] L I N )[ N / (
k k k xN N N − γ − , and the off-
diagonal elements are B
12 = 
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2 1xN N γ . Similarly, we partition the share vectors 
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1 τ τ + τ =  and likewise for the price vectors  1 pτ  and  2 pτ, 
τ=t-1,t. If  t 1 t I I I ∩ = − , then all the goods i= N1+1,…,N are new or disappearing , with either    35
2
1 it s −  = 0 or  2
it s  = 0. More generally, with  t 1 t I I I ∩ ⊂ −  then some of the goods i= N1+1,…,N are 
new or disappearing, with zero share. So we use the notation  2 p ~
τ  to denote the reservation prices 
for those goods with zero share in period τ = t-1,t, but the same vector uses actual prices for 
those goods with positive shares.  
Then the share equations in periods t-1 and t for the goods i= N1+1,…,N are: 





1 t p ~ ln B p ln B a s − − − + + = ,     





t p ~ ln B p ln B a s + + = ,      
where some of these shares can be zero. From these equations we solve for the reservation prices 
for new and disappearing goods (and actual prices for the goods with positive shares): 
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It follows that,    
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Substituting (A1) into the Törnqvist price index, we obtain: 
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From the definition of the partitioned matrix B, we have that: 
   22 B  =  ] L I N [
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where  ] L I N [
2 2 2 N N N × −  has an eigenvector  1 x N2 L with the associated eigenvalue of N1, so its 
inverse matrix has the reciprocal eigenvalue.  Then by definition of 
21 B =
21 Nx N (/ N ) [ L ] γ  we can 
simplify the second term on the right of (A2) as:   36
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Notice that  ()
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N
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1 s s 1
1
− = + −  .  Substituting these results into  
the right-hand side of (A2), we can combine the first and second terms as: 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 22 21 1 1 11
tt 1 t t 1 tt 1 t t 1 22 (s s )'(lnp lnp ) (s s )' B B (lnp lnp )
−
−− − −  +− − + −   
()
()
), p ln p )(ln s s (






)' s s (















































































1 i i N
1
i i s 1 s s ,  for i = 1,…,N1, and  τ = t-1, t. 
Reintroducing the notation (i,j) to denote each product, and noting that N1 equals Nas used in 
the text, this gives us equation (11).  
  The final term in (A2) is also simplified using (A3). Substituting for B
22 and dropping the 
negative sign for notation convenience, the final term in (A3) becomes:   37
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Again reintroducing the notation (i,j) to denote each product, and noting that N1=N and that   
i= N–N2,…,N are not in the set  I, this gives us equation (12).   QED 
 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
First, we need to show that (19) is a second-order approximation to (18), around the point 
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where we note that the summations above are over  i jJ ∈ and only the last line relies on 
i
jt i s( 1 / N ) = , from (20).  
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∈ ≡   is the unweighted mean of the log-prices for country i. Again from  
(20), these are identical to the weighted mean of log-prices defined in the text,  it lnp ≡ 
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∈  . Then using the shares in Theorem 2 and (19), we re-write the above result as: 
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Using the formula for the defined shares in Theorem 2, we can re-write P as: 
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From  (20) note that  i it it 1 HH 1 / N − == for iI , ∈ and using this repeatedly we can simplify P as: 
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Then substituting for V from (12), we obtain the result shown in (22).  QED 
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Appendix B: Data 
  The dataset used for this project contains quantity, value, and price information 
aggregated at the HS-10 digit level, as well as HS-4 digit level Herfindahl Indexes, for the U.S. 
and all countries exporting to the U.S. for every year from 1992 to 2005.  
  One challenge in piecing together this dataset was calculating the amount of U.S. 
absorption produced in the U.S. We begin with the identity that the U.S. supply of U.S. 
absorption is equal to the difference between U.S. production and exports.  We obtained data on 
industry-level production from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at www.bea.gov and export 
data from  http://www.internationaldata.org/. Unfortunately, the BEA production data are 
classified according to the SIC system for years 1992 to 1997 and according to the NAICS 
system for years 1998 to 2005, while the trade data is at the HS-10 digit level. Addressing this 
complication required a two-step process: the first step was to adjust the BEA production data so 
that the data are on the NAICS level for all years within the sample. The second step was to use 
our import/export data (containing both NAICS and HS-10 digit codes) and our newly created 
NAICS level production data to infer domestically produced absorption at the HS-10 digit level, 
as described below.  
  It is not easy to concord SIC and NAICS categories because there is not always a one-to-
one mapping between the two. To deal with this issue, we first used a NAICS-SIC concordance 
from the BEA to convert the SIC data to the NAICS level. The absence of a one-to-one mapping 
meant that sometimes we would observe large jumps in a NAICS category derived from SIC 
data from 1997 relative to what the 1998.  In order to deal with this problem, we used a 
“bridging dataset”, from the U.S. Department of Commerce, containing SIC level values for both 
1997 and 1998. This enabled us to construct a ratio between the actual NAICS output levels and   41
the NAICS levels that we constructed from the SIC data for 1998. We then multiplied all of 
NAICS data that was constructed from the SIC data by this ratio. If a SIC sector did not match 
any NAICS sector we dropped the observations prior to 1998 in the estimation. We also dropped 
all changes between 1997 and 1998 in the regressions where we estimated γ, so that concordance 
problems would not affect our estimates.  
  After our BEA data was brought to the NAICS level, we use it, along with our import and 
export data, to calculate HS-10 digit level U.S. domestic supply. We begin with the identity that 
U.S. supply for the domestic market at the NAICS level – denoted by k – equals U.S. production 
at the NAICS level less U.S. exports: 
  kk k
tt t Supply Production Exports =− . 
Using the NAICS import data, we can compute the share of U.S. supply in apparent consumption 












By assuming that the U.S. share of a NAICS code is equal to that of the U.S. share in a 
corresponding HS-10 code, we calculate supply at the HS-10 digit level using the following 
formula: 
kH S 1 0






















  We next needed to merge in data for Herfindahl indexes for domestic firms and exporters 
to the U.S. For land shipments from Canada, we purchased Herfindahl indexes at the 4-digit   42
Harmonized system (HS) level, for 1996 and 2005, from Statistics Canada. These Canadian 
Herfindahl indexes were constructed from firm-level export data to the U.S.  
  For land shipments from Mexico, the Herfindahl indexes were constructed using data 
sourced from the Encuesta Industrial Anual (Annual Industrial Survey) of the Instituto Nacional 
de Estadistica y Geografia. This data contains firm-level exports for 205 CMAP94 categories for 
1993 and 2003. We also obtained the export Herfindahl for 232 categories at the HS-4 level. 
These categories cover the most important Mexican export sectors.  
  For all other major exporters to the U.S., we computed these Herfindahls for sea 
shipments from PIERS (www.piers.com), for 1992 and 2005. PIERS collects data from the bill 
of landing for every container that enters a U.S. port. The median country exports about 80 
percent of its goods by sea. Thus for the typical country in our sample, the sea data covers a large 
fraction of their exports. Although purchasing the disaggregated data is prohibitively expensive, 
we were able to obtain information on shipments to the U.S. for the 50,000 largest exporters to 
the U.S., for 1992 and 2005.  For each exporter and year, we obtained the estimated value, 
quantity and country of origin of the top five HS-4 digit sectors in which the firm was active. We 
also obtained this data for the top ten HS-4 digit sectors for the largest 250 firms in each year.  
The Piers data has a number of limitations relative to other firm level data sets. The first 
is relatively minor: we do not have the universe of exporters but only the largest ones. This turns 
out not to be a serious problem because the aggregate value of these exporters is typically within 
5 percent of total sea shipments. Thus, smaller exporters are unlikely to have a qualitatively 
important impact on our results. 
A larger problem is that the PIERS data only comprises sea shipments and thus we have 
no information in these data on land and air shipments. This means that we have to adjust our   43
Herfindahl indexes to take into account land and air shipments. The Herfindahl of country i’s 
exports in sector k can be written as 
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it V denotes the value of sea (total) shipments and  kNon Sea
it H − is the Herfindahl 
for non-sea exporters, which is defined analogously as the sea Herfindahl. We do not have a 
measure of  kNon Sea
it H − , but theory does place bounds on the size of the Herfindahl since the true 
index must be contained in the following set, obtained with  kNon Sea
it H − =1 or 0:  
22 2 kSea kSea kSea
kSea kSea it it it





    
 +−              
. 
For most sectors the share of sea shipments in total shipments is quite high, so these bounds are 
quite tight. In the analysis we assume that  kSea kNon Sea
it it HH − = , but our results do not change 
qualitatively if we assume that  kNon Sea
it H − or 0.
17  
  For the U.S. Herfindahls, we rely on data from the Census of Manufactures are at the 
NAICS 6-digit level. Unfortunately, this is more aggregate than the 4-digit HS level at which we 
have the foreign export Herfindahl indexes. Accordingly, we need to convert the U.S. Herfindahl 
indexes from the NAICS 6-digit level to the HS 4-digit level. Slightly abusing our earlier country 
notation, let  k iI ∈  denote a 4-digit sector i within the NAICS code k. Then the Herfindahl for 4-
digit sector i is 
i
ki 2
it jt jJ H( s )
∈ ≡ , where  i
jt s  is the share of firm  i jJ ∈  in sector i. We see that the 
overall Herfindahl in NAICS code k is: 
                                                 
17 One can see this from a simple example. Our median sea Herfindahl is 0.6 and our median share of sea shipments 
is 0.8. This means that the true Herfindahl ranges from .38 to .42 and our estimate would be 0.41. Nevertheless, we 
are implicitly assuming that goods shipped by air and goods shipped by sea are not the same. We justify this 
assumption because it costs substantially more to ship goods by air, and thus the mode of shipment is likely to 
differentiate the goods in some important ways.    44
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where  k
it s  is the share of 4-digit HS sector i within NAICS sector k, and  ki k
jt jt it ss s =  is the share of 
product j within the NAICS sector,  k jJ ∈  . In words, the inner-product of the Herfindahl firm 
indexes and the squared sector shares, on the left of (B2) is exactly the right way to aggregate 
these indexes to obtain an overall Herfindahl for the good k in question, on the right of (B2).  
One of the problems that we faced is that we know 
k
t H  but not 
k
it H . A solution can be obtained 
by assuming that 
k
it H  is equal across all 4-digit sectors ik ∈ , in which case we solve for 
k






HH /( s )
∈
=  . (B3) 
In other words, the 4-digit HS Herfindahl is estimated by dividing the 6-digit NAICS Herfindahl 
by the corresponding Herfindahl index of 4-digit HS shares within the 6-digit sector. This simple 
solution assumes that the 4-digit HS Herfindahl indexes are constant within a sector, but is the 
best that we can do in the absence of additional data. 
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Table 1 
Ranking in Terms of Share of U.S. Total Absorption 
   1992       1997 
      
Country  
Herfindahl 
Index  Share 
Weighted 





United  States  0.147  0.801 0.1114   United States  0.155  0.745 0.1107 
Canada  0.245  0.038 0.0106   Canada  0.252  0.052 0.0132 
Japan  0.310  0.036 0.0094   Japan  0.313  0.035 0.0100 
Mexico  0.393  0.012 0.0040   Mexico 0.407  0.024 0.0086 
German  0.358  0.010 0.0030   China  0.293  0.017 0.0019 
China  0.366  0.010 0.0011   German  0.357  0.012 0.0035 
Taiwan  0.365  0.008 0.0015   United Kingdom 0.331  0.009 0.0028 
South Korea  0.419  0.007  0.0017   Taiwan  0.369  0.008 0.0022 
United Kingdom  0.309  0.007  0.0020   South  Korea  0.396  0.007 0.0023 
Saudi Arabia  0.427  0.005  0.0010   Malaysia  0.398  0.006 0.0016 
Weighted 
Ave.  0.160 
  
0.0781 
  Weighted Ave. 0.170 
  
0.0692 
                
                         
   1998       2005 
      
Country  
Herfindahl 
Index  Share 
Weighted 





United  States  0.183  0.781 0.1392   United States  0.189  0.692 0.1289 
Canada  0.249  0.043 0.0111   Canada  0.242  0.056 0.0146 
Japan  0.318  0.030 0.0085   China  0.188  0.041 0.0026 
Mexico  0.419  0.022 0.0083   Mexico 0.403  0.031 0.0101 
China  0.280  0.017 0.0017   Japan  0.331  0.025 0.0078 
German  0.332  0.012 0.0034   German 0.335  0.015 0.0049 
United  Kingdom 0.331  0.007 0.0025   United Kingdom 0.331  0.009 0.0025 
Taiwan  0.340  0.007 0.0018   South Korea  0.338  0.009 0.0028 
South Korea  0.377  0.006  0.0020   Venezuala  0.556  0.008 0.0046 
France  0.371  0.005 0.0020   Saudi Arabia  0.447  0.006 0.0019 
Weighted 
Ave.  0.190 
  
0.0903 





The Herfindahl Index is the weighted average of the country's Herfindahl Index, where the weights 
correspond to the share of each HS-4 sector in U.S. apparent consumption. "Share" sit is defined to be the 
country's share of U.S. apparent consumption. The "Weighted Average Hitsit" is the weighted average of 
the Herfindahl Index in sector i in year t multiplied by that country's share of U.S. apparent consumption; 
the weights are the same as before. The last row reports a weighted average across all countries using 
each country's share of U.S. apparent consumption as weights. Thus, the number shown in the last row 
and column of each panel is Σi Hit(sit)
2 , averaged across sectors.  48
 
Table 2 
 Distribution of  γ Estimates 
Statistic Value    Standard  Deviation 
Mean 11.90  1.75 
Median 0.19  0.01 
Median Number of 





Gamma Values From Sectors with High Shares of Domestic Absorption 
Hs4  γ 
Average Share of 
Total Absorption 
Passenger motor vehicles  0.14  0.07 
Parts and accessories for non-passenger motor vehicles  0.39  0.05 
Crude petroleum  0.76  0.04 
Automatic data processing machines  0.18  0.03 
Non-military aircrafts  0.06  0.02 
Cartons, boxes, cases, bags and other packing containers 0.25  0.02 
Cell phones  0.07  0.01 
Cigarettes  1.41 0.01 
Plastics  0.05 0.01 
Natural Gas  1.11  0.01 




   Partial Markup and Variety Effects 
Range of Herfindahl 
Movement Defined 
As “Common”  Specification P  V  Total  (P+V) 
(1/1.3,1.3) Benchmark  -0.017  -0.037  -0.054 
(1/1.3,1.3)  No passenger vehicles sector   -0.013  -0.013  -0.026 
(1/1.1,1.1) Change  Herfindahl  range  -0.015  -0.030  -0.044 
(1/1.2,1.2) Change  Herfindahl  range  -0.016  -0.035  -0.050 
(1/1.4,1.4)  Change Herfindahl range  -0.014 -0.035 -0.049 
(1/1.5,1.5)  Change Herfindahl range  -0.010 -0.029 -0.039 
(1/1.3,1.3)  Sum of 92-97 and 98-05  -0.018  -0.034  -0.051 
(1/1.3,1.3)  Herfindahls Set to 1992 Values  -0.032  -0.004  -0.036 













Figure 3a: Distribution of 2γV 
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Figure 3c: Distribution of 2γ(P-V)  
 
 
 